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Abstract: This article examines the function and role of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” (including 
the FTAAP) in China’s foreign policy strategy by analysing the speech in which Xi Jinping 
promoted this dream, and creating a link between China’s push for regional economic 
integration, soft power strategy and “universal values”. While China is promoting this concept 
and the FTAAP to increase its influence in the region, the U.S. have also been rebalancing to 
Asia through different means, such as its push for the TPP. These two free trade agreements 
(FTA), though not mutually exclusive, are considered to be directed against each other, 
indicating a struggle for influence in the region, and also seem to entail an ideological agenda. 
As both the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and the U.S. “pivot to Asia” are connected to major FTA’s, 
this paper argues that the motives for promoting these FTAs go far beyond economic 
interests; the research suggests that they are used to increase soft power in the region as well 
as to influence the discourse on “universal values”. 
 
Keywords: Asia-Pacific Dream, Chinese Foreign Policy, U.S. pivot to Asia, soft power, 
universal values. 
 
Introduction 
Over the past decades, the influence of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to 
as China) in East Asia has increased remarkably; not only in terms of economic and military 
might, but also in terms of soft power that has played a major role in increasing influence in 
the region. China’s increasing engagement in international institutions and regional 
cooperation in East Asia has been subject to growing concern in the international community, 
and China’s neighbors in particular, who are wary of the rising superpower and thus engage in 
hedging activities against China. At the same time, the United States are also trying to 
increase influence in the region, shifting major resources away from the Middle East and its 
war on terror to the East Asian region. This movement is also known as the U.S. “pivot to 
Asia”. Currently, there are several FTA initiatives that the two world powers are pushing for, 
including the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-led Free Trade Area of 
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the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) – the latter playing a significant role in Xi Jinping’s promotion of 
an “Asia-Pacific Dream”.  
In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out three major topics for APEC which are: advanced 
regional economic integration; promoting innovative development, economic reform and 
growth; and strengthening comprehensive development in infrastructure and connectivity (Xi, 
2014). The three key elements that constitute the concept of China’s “Asia-Pacific Dream” 
similarly focus on (1) development, (2) economic connectivity, and (3) Asian unity with an 
emphasis on harmony, mutual benefits and prosperity in the region.  
As the economic reasons for promoting the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and the connected 
FTAAP are obvious, the intention of this article is to find out which role the “Asia-Pacific 
Dream” plays in China’s soft power and ideological strategy. The focus here will be on 
China’s intentions for promoting this dream and its potential hidden agenda. This article 
argues that one potential reason for China’s free trade initiatives is to increase its soft power 
in the region and to undermine “universal values”. In other words, China may use the FTAAP 
and other economic integration initiatives as tools to fight an ideological battle with the U.S. 
By using the “Asia-Pacific Dream” as an example, this article is an approach to generate the 
link between economic integration, soft power and “universal values”. Hence, the aim of my 
research is to fill in the gap in the existing literature by generating this missing link. With this 
approach, I seek to find answers and explanations for the following research questions: 
 
RQ 1) Which role does the “Asia-Pacific Dream” play in consolidating China’s soft 
power in the East Asian and Southeast Asian region? 
 
RQ 2) How and why may the promotion of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” reshape the 
discourse on “universal values”? 
 
This article is a summary of an extensive research project that I finished in 2016. Within my 
original research, I also closely examined the applicability of prevailing IR theories, such as 
realism, liberalism and constructivism, in order to understand China’s interest and behavior in 
the region. There are various opinions in academic circles on whether or not IR theories, 
which are mainly of Western origin, are relevant and applicable in explaining Asian 
international relations. Since they are often criticized of being too abstract and disconnected 
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from everyday reality in Asian affairs, Acharya (2014) suggests combining them with an 
empirical or policy-related analysis, such as analyzing speeches and writings of policy 
makers, because they reflect mental or social constructs that provide a better understanding of 
different paradigms than prevailing theories alone. The method that I have used within my 
research paper is a “disciplined-configurative” case study; I have used established theories 
and applied them to one specific case in order to generate new facts, concepts and hypotheses 
(George & Bennett, 2005: 75). The specific case used in this research is Xi Jinping’s 
promotion of the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, based on his speech at the opening ceremony at the 
2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing. The theoretical framework comprised both international 
relations and soft power theories that are used to strengthen my arguments in the analysis and 
act as an explanatory framework. This means that while my argumentation may partly be 
based on assumptions and hypotheses, the theories function as a theoretical tool to prove, 
justify and validate my hypotheses and arguments put forth in the analysis and discussion. 
 
However, the part in which I used IR theories as a framework to explain how and why China 
is using the “Asia-Pacific Dream” to position itself in a certain way, will be omitted here due 
to the limited scope of this article. Instead, my focus here will be on the link between free 
trade agreements, soft power and “universal values”. 
  
China’s Soft Power Strategy 
According to Li (2015: 30), China’s diplomatic strategy in the East Asian region has several 
objectives, i.e., to maintain stable and friendly relationships with its neighbors and build 
mutual trust, obtain stable supply of resources to maintain economic growth, obtain a strong 
position of political influence, prevent the formation of a strategic alliance that is directed 
against China, gain the region’s support in its international strategy, create a multipolarized 
world and expand its soft power. Regarding China’s soft power strategy, Young and Jong 
(2008: 460) have identified two main directions: one is directed at finding appropriate 
countermeasures to American soft power strategy, and the other direction is based on how 
foreign policy measures will path China’s way to becoming a global power.  
 
In line with the first identified direction of China’s soft power, this article argues that various 
elements in China’s soft power strategy, including the “Beijing consensus”, the concept of a 
“harmonious world”, and the newly promoted “Asia-Pacific Dream” function as tools to 
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balance against American soft power. Furthermore, they may help to improve China’s 
international image and support China’s political legitimacy, while simultaneously 
undermining U.S. influence in the region. This direction is of strategic importance for China 
because U.S. soft power, including the promotion of “universal values”, puts a major threat to 
China’s political legitimacy and nourishes international wariness toward China’s peaceful 
rise. At the same time, a successful “Asia-Pacific Dream” and FTAAP may strengthen 
China’s position as a regional and global power player due to the entailed economic 
interdependencies. 
  
The Role of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” in China’s Soft Power Strategy 
Joseph Nye defined soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political 
ideals, and policies” (Nye, 2004: X). With regard to the changing role of military power, 
technological developments and interdependencies among states, McCormick (2007: 11) 
argues that the most powerful state actors today are those who have attraction power and 
create opportunities instead of posing threats to other actors. 
In order to explain how the “Asia-Pacific Dream” is closely linked to and incorporated in 
China’s soft power strategy, I will use an extended soft power concept that is based on six soft 
power sources (i.e. culture, political values, foreign policies, economic development model, 
international image, and economic temptation) (Nye, 2004; Men, 2007; Li & Worn, 2010) 
and two soft power mechanisms (i.e. norm diffusion and discourse dominance) (Rothman, 
2011). 
In order to validate my argumentation put forth in this article, it is crucial to understand 
how these soft power sources, including foreign policies and economic development models, 
turn into soft power. The soft power mechanism norm diffusion plays a key role in this regard: 
it refers to a mechanism in which a country is attracted to another country’s culture, policy 
practices or ideals if these are perceived to be successful, beneficial or ethically right 
(Rothman, 2011: 56-57). The success of the particular culture, policy or ideal thereby 
increases its attractiveness to another actor. Due to this dependency on success or failure, 
competitiveness is a main element of the mechanism of norm diffusion. Since norms do not 
follow rational calculation, actors influenced by norm diffusion behave according to what 
they perceive as being normal or right. Norms can be diffused through either teaching and 
learning or a successful demonstration of the norm in operation; a successful demonstration 
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will furthermore enhance the prestige, credibility and acceptance of the norm’s implementer 
(Rothman, 2011: 58). 
Figure 1: Extended Chinese Soft Power Concept 
 
Source: Illustration compiled by author; based on Nye (2004), Men (2007), Li & Worm 
(2010), and Rothman (2011). 
 
By linking the elements of this extended soft power concept to the three key elements in the 
“Asia-Pacific Dream” (i.e. development, economic connectivity, and Asian unity with an 
emphasis on harmony, mutual benefits and prosperity for the whole region), I will explain the 
role of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” in consolidating China’s soft power in the region: 
  
(1) Development  
A major part of Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing was devoted 
to highlighting China’s stability and remarkable achievements in economic growth, as well as 
its leading position and importance in the region. He invited all countries to “get on board the 
train of China’s development”, thus indirectly implying that they have to either accept 
China’s leading role and underlying conditions, or risk falling behind the development of 
other nations (Tiezzi, 2014). Due to China’s tremendous economic achievements since the 
opening up reform in 1979, along with the country’s huge and cheap labor force, the Chinese 
market has become very attractive for companies worldwide. This advantage gives China a 
high potential for enhancing its soft power in terms of economic temptation. As Xi (2014) 
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emphasized new paths and models for development, we can also draw a connection between 
the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and the soft power sources economic development model and to 
some degree political values due to the special characteristics of China’s development model, 
often referred to as the “Beijing consensus”. Furthermore, we can draw a connection to the 
soft power mechanism of norm diffusion as China’s neighbors may adopt attributes of the 
“China Model” if they perceive it as being beneficial for them.  
The “China Model”, or “Beijing consensus”, was first coined by Joshua C. Ramo in 2004 
as an alternative political and economic framework to the “Washington consensus”. He 
identified three main characteristics of the “China Model”: (1) focus on innovation and 
experimentation, (2) sustainable and equitable growth, and (3) adherence to national self-
determination (in Liu, 2010). Many Western and Chinese scholars go far beyond this 
definition, and since the CCP is not using this term in its official rhetoric either, there seems 
to be no clear consensus on what the “China Model” actually is. However, the literature 
suggests some overlapping characteristics that are:  a strong leading role of the political 
authoritarian party, market liberalization in the absence of political liberalization, gradual 
reform and innovation to achieve economic growth, self-determination and a non-
interventionist approach (Kyriakides, 2010: 19-20; Liu, 2010; Smith, 2010: 30-31). According 
to Ramo (2004: 3), the “Beijing consensus” is not only a model for China, but it “has begun to 
remake the whole landscape of international development, economics, society and, by 
extension, politics”. 
Despite its authoritarian nature, the success of China’s political economy and outstanding 
economic growth has made the “Beijing consensus” more attractive to developing countries - 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America - than the prevailing “Washington consensus”, and China is 
promoting this model - and thereby increasing its attraction to those regions - by economic aid 
and by allowing market access without any political strings attached (Wesley-Smith, 2007: 
23; Li & Worm, 2010: 81). According to Li and Worm (Ibid.), the “Beijing consensus” is 
China’s most important soft power source, because it provides a stronger attraction power to 
many countries in the developing world than other aspects of China’s soft power, such as 
culture. 
However, one has to be prudent when using this argument as China is not using the term 
“Beijing consensus” in its official rhetoric and the Chinese emphasize that they respect each 
country’s diversity and own development model (Cong, 2013). Because of this, it is difficult 
to argue that China is trying to export the “Beijing consensus” to its neighboring states; 
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however, as will be discussed below, Xi Jinping is pushing for new models of development 
and may at least attempt to gain some credibility and legitimacy for China’s own path of 
development. 
 
(2) Economic Connectivity 
Another important element that Xi Jinping emphasized in his speech is economic 
connectivity. Since the economic dimension constitutes the core of his dream, China’s push 
for the FTAAP and its idea of a Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road are closely 
related to it or can be regarded as a part of this dream (Tiezzi, 2014). The “Asia-Pacific 
Dream” entails strong economic incentives for China’s neighboring states, including an 
investment of $40 billion in the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and Silk Road Fund that will foster the establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt 
and Silk Road Maritime Belt. Furthermore, China plans to invest $1.41 trillion until 2025 to 
support development projects in the region (Shambaugh, 2015a). From this it becomes 
obvious that China is providing strong incentives for its neighboring countries to tighten 
regional economic bonds. Although Xi (2014) said that the door should always be open to the 
entire world, the “Asia-Pacific Dream” implies the exclusion of non-Asian actors such as the 
United States since it promotes an “Asia for Asians” (Tiezzi, 2014). Similarly, Shambaugh 
(2014) regards the FTAAP as a countermeasure against the TPP and furthermore argues that 
Xi’s ideas of a Silk Road Economic Belt and Silk Road Maritime Belt are directed against the 
U.S. pivot because of their emphasis on Asian connectivity and infrastructure connectivity 
from which the United States are naturally geographically excluded.  
China-U.S. relations have been locked in a long-term competitive relationship, including 
economic, strategic, military, diplomatic, and cultural competition, as well as a competition 
for soft power (Ibid.). In order to become a comparable player to Western countries, not only 
in terms of hard power, including military and economic might, but also in terms of soft 
power, China will need to put more effort into promoting Chinese values and ideas that will 
contribute to becoming a future leader. These efforts also include China’s strengthening of 
ASEAN diplomacy, establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
introduction of a new security concept and push for FTA through ASEAN (Young & Jong, 
2008: 472).  
Also, the internationalization of the Chinese Renminbi plays an important role here. Not 
only will it benefit China’s image as a stable and global power player, but it will also 
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strengthen China’s voice in international affairs. Du (2010) argues that the 
internationalization of the RMB will bring far more benefits and “soft gains” for China than 
costs; it will provide China with higher economic, political and diplomatic influencing power 
and, hence, be beneficial for the country’s soft power. Also, it will help China counteract any 
negative effects of U.S. policies (Wang, 2016). 
According to Razeen Sally (2013), who examined China’s trade policies and preferential 
trade agreements, China’s approach to trade agreements is rather light on trade; not even the 
trade agreement between China and ASEAN, that came into effect in January 2010 and covers 
11 economies with a total population of 1.7 billion people, will likely lead to significantly 
more trade and investment. Regarding the driving force behind China’s trade agreements, he 
explains that “foreign-policy ‘soft power’, i.e. diplomacy and relationship-building, is 
paramount” (Sally, 2013: 188), including motives such as securing influence and competing 
for leadership credentials in the East Asian region. This can be seen in the promotion of trade 
through institutions such as APEC, which will not only strengthen economic relationships but 
also serve as a foundation to improve the relationship on the political level. As this may lead 
to mutual trust and more political cooperation, it could also be beneficial for China’s interests 
in the South China Sea. It can therefore be argued that the intentions behind the “Asia-Pacific 
Dream” go far beyond economic interests; through soft power, China intends to improve its 
political relationships with its neighbors by increasing economic cooperation and 
interdependence. 
With regard to what has already been discussed above, Xi’s grand gesture of economic aid 
may increase China’s soft power and international image in a positive direction. Here, we can 
see a connection to the soft power concepts economic temptation and foreign policies that are 
perceived to be beneficial for China’s neighboring countries. 
 
(3) Asian Unity and The Emphasis on Harmony, Mutual Benefits and Prosperity for The 
Whole Region 
The “Asia-Pacific Dream” is intended to promote Asian unity with shared destinies, and 
centers around peace, development and mutual benefits (CCPIT, 2014). The emphasis on 
harmony is closely related to some of China’s already existing soft power concepts, such as 
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and “harmonious world”. Hence, the notion of 
harmony appears to be a reoccurring concept in China’s soft power strategy, and it is in 
China’s strategic interest to further promote harmony because it may improve the country’s 
Anke Berndzen  JCIR: VOL. 5, No. 1 (2017) 
 
9 
 
international image that has been overshadowed in the past due to Mao’s rule, human rights 
violations, the “China threat theory”, and incidents such as the Tiananmen Square massacre. 
The Chinese government has continually tried to improve its image and uses these concepts to 
convince its neighbors of China’s peaceful rise and intentions. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on 
Asian unity also entails the idea of shared culture and values, including the spread of Chinese 
political values and governing principles (Ni, 2014) that are, again, related to the “Beijing 
consensus”. In terms of culture, the “Asia-Pacific Dream” is intended to increase 
communication and various forms of interaction between the countries that will facilitate the 
spread of Chinese culture, and therefore may also help to increase socialization and a shared 
Asian identity, as it is believed by constructivist scholars. Due to increased interaction and 
communication between the countries, norm diffusion as a soft power mechanism will 
eventually also become more effective, since norms and values can be diffused through 
teaching and learning, or a successful demonstration of the norm in operation (Rothman, 
2011: 58). According to Xi’s speech, China intends to create win-win situations that are 
mutually beneficial for all countries in the region and will create prosperity for the whole 
region. Again, this idea is connected to the soft power source economic temptation. This win-
win approach is often emphasized by the Chinese, not only in international politics but also in 
business relations, but it is criticized as being a zero-sum game instead (Dujarric, 2011; Fang, 
1998) and it seems like Chinese policymakers have an “I win, you lose” mentality.  
 
The above analysis of the key elements of the “Asia-Pacific Dream’s” provides us with the 
realization that the concept is deeply incorporated into and resembles China’s prevailing soft 
power sources and mechanisms. This leads me to the supposition that the intentions behind 
the “Asia-Pacific Dream” exceed a push toward regional economic integration. Instead, the 
concept itself can be regarded as part of China’s soft power and it affects various other 
dimensions of political, strategic and ideological importance. As Samm Sacks stated, the idea 
of the Chinese government is to use trade and investment to gain more political support from 
its neighbors and to foster a Chinese-led form of economic prosperity to enhance China’s 
image as a great power (in Rosen, 2014). However, Shambaugh (2015a) criticizes China’s 
latest soft power initiatives, including the “Asia-Pacific Dream” as being relatively fruitless. 
He pointed out that China is investing billions of dollars in a variety of public relations efforts 
in order to improve China’s reputation and image. China has pledged to invest US$1.41 
trillion worldwide until 2025, which is unprecedented in human history. However, China’s 
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investments seem to yield a low return due to the country’s contradictive behavior. Hence, he 
argues that China is trying to buy influence in the region which does not seem to work:  
 
The Chinese government approaches public diplomacy the same way it constructs 
high-speed rail or builds infrastructure — by investing money and expecting to 
see development (Ibid.).  
 
He concludes that as long as China’s political system keeps controlling its citizens, opinions 
abroad, and does not enable free human development and direct interaction between its 
citizens and the outside world, its propaganda efforts and investments in soft power will not 
pay off.  
 
The Discourse on “Universal Values” 
While the discussion above has made clear that there is a link between China’s economic 
integration and free trade initiatives and soft power, I want to take the discussion one step 
further and evaluate whether we can also draw a connection to the discourse on “universal 
values”. According to the United Nations (2003), “human rights and universal values are 
almost synonymous” and refer to values of peace, freedom, social progress, equal rights and 
human dignity. These values have been agreed upon by the United Nations and enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Proponents of such values define them as 
either being valued and held in common by all, or at least the majority of, human beings; or, 
as Sen (1999: 12) claims, that something is of “universal value” if people anywhere in the 
world have reason to consider it as being valuable. Although democracy is not being 
universally practiced yet, it has achieved the status of being generally right and is widely 
considered as being a “universal value” because a democratic system is based on certain 
values that ensure citizens’ political freedom, civil rights, social and political participation and 
other rights that enhance the wellbeing of society and individuals (Sen, 1999: 5, 10).  
Because of this, China is still being sharply criticized, especially by Western countries, for 
human rights violations, lack of democratic rights and the authoritarian nature of the regime, 
which systematically curbs fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, association 
and religion, if these practices are believed to potentially threaten the government (Human 
Rights Watch, 2015b). Also, the CCP’s denial of genuine democracy in Hong Kong and the 
detention and later death of human rights activist Cao Shunli in 2014 clearly demonstrate the 
party’s hostility toward “universal values” and human rights activists. Other issues that are of 
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great concern are the ethnic discrimination and religious and cultural suppression in Xinjiang 
and Tibet, violations of the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression, and 
discrimination against women, disabled people and homosexuals. Also, the detention and trial 
of the famous Chinese human rights blogger and lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, has gained 
international attention. Observers expect that he will have to face eight years in prison for 
publishing seven microblog posts on Weibo that, according to the indictment, “incited ethnic 
hatred”, “created disturbances” and led to “adverse social impact” (Human Rights Watch, 
2015a; BBC, 2015). Due to this case, China is again sharply criticized for its lack of the “rule 
of law” and a new low point in the worsening climate of freedom of speech (BBC, 2015). 
Altogether, the Human Rights Watch (2015b) concluded that China has taken major steps 
backwards on human rights issues under the leadership of Xi Jinping. 
In China, the term “universal values” (普世价值 pushi jiazhi) is relatively new in the 
political debate, though its associated concepts, such as freedom, human rights and 
democracy, have been discussed for many decades, especially after the massacre at 
Tiananmen Square in 1989. From a philosophical perspective, one can argue about the actual 
existence of “universal values” since values are subjective beliefs, morals or cultural norms 
that differ from person to person and culture to culture. Even the same kind of value may have 
a different meaning for each individual. However, in recent years, the discourse has changed 
from a philosophical question into a political and ideological battle. One the one hand, there 
are universalists who believe that “universal values” are commonly demanded by all 
humankind and that China should eventually converge on democratic norms. On the other 
hand, there are exceptionalists who believe that China is different from other countries and 
deny the existence of “universal values”, hence China should preserve its authoritarianism 
(The Economist, 2011). Many liberal scholars are worried about some of the views amongst 
the exceptionalist wing, such as the belief that the West is using the promotion of “universal 
values” to undermine China’s achievements and power. Wang (2013) claims that “universal 
values” have been used as a tool to ensure U.S. hegemony and that they have resulted in 
various forms of the “China threat theory”. Some also worry that this may have a negative 
influence on Chinese behavior, resulting in a confluence of nationalism and deep feelings of 
victimhood, along with an increasing military force (The Economist, 2011).  
Zhou Xincheng (2009), professor at the School of Marxism at Renmin University of 
China, criticizes the promotion of “universal values” as they are not really universal, because 
each kind of value always reflects the system of values of just a fraction of people. He defines 
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values as being the meaning and function of an object or issue that is different for each 
person. Of course, he says that people in a society form a certain range of behavioral norms 
and standards, but due to each person’s and culture’s background, the meaning of these norms 
differs for each individual; therefore, he concludes that values can never be universal and are 
specific to each individual. Also, since the values and behavioral norms of a certain society 
change over time and are influenced by the underlying circumstances, such as social 
conditions and economy, the historical and cultural context of a society’s values always need 
to be taken into consideration. His main criticism is that advocates of “universal values” 
simply extract a commonality or overlap of different systems’ sets of values and declare it as 
being universal while neglecting the actual meaning and function that it has for each system 
and society (Ibid.). The Marxist scholar Li (2011) moreover criticizes “universal values” 
because even though it seems that the discussion of “universal values” is just a theoretical 
topic in the philosophy of values, it is in reality a concept that comes from Western countries 
which is used for political and ideological purposes. This view is also shared by Zhang (2013: 
259) who believes that the West is promoting these values “behind a deceptive veil” to 
achieve their political and ideological objectives. Li (2011) alleges “universal values” to be a 
specific political proposition aimed at changing the development of China’s political system 
and society. According to him, a society’s core values should be based on cultural and 
historical inheritance rather than the exploiting class’ core values (i.e. the Western capitalist 
countries, particularly the United States of America).  
Another Marxist scholar, Hou Huiqin (2011), argues that the basic purpose of promoting 
“universal values” is to bring China’s current reform politics onto the path of the capitalist 
world civilization and to intervene in China’s democratic politics, as well as putting an end to 
the national power construct of CCP leadership. Therefore, he sees the promotion of 
“universal values” as an expression of the current Western discourse hegemony and mode of 
value infiltration. Furthermore, “universal values” deny the establishment of democratic 
politics of China’s special socialism (中国特色社会主义 zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi); and 
adopting a Western democratic model, especially a U.S. democratic model, would totally 
change and interfere with the socialist direction of China’s democratic politics, in which the 
paramount interests of the nation over the individual are being emphasized. However, he does 
not really criticize the essence of the values, rather how their promotion intervenes in China’s 
special socialism and reform politics. 
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Based on evidence from public speeches and quotes, the attitudes of China’s recent leaders 
toward “universal values” seem to be quite mixed, though the actual implementation of their 
proclamations always requires some critical examination. In April 2006, Hu Jintao made a 
speech at Yale University, saying that the Chinese government vigorously promotes economic 
and social development, ensuring that the citizens enjoy freedom, democracy and human 
rights, as well as social fairness and justice (in Wu, 2008). In an interview in September 2006 
with five overseas news media, Wen Jiabao said that,  
 
democracy is a system of values commonly pursued by the human race and 
commonly created achievement of civilization, but in different stages of history, 
in different countries, its forms and ways of realization have nothing in common 
with each other, there is no unified model (own direct translation, in Wu, 2008).  
 
According to him, a socialist system and democracy do not deviate from one another, as he 
considers a high degree of democracy and a complete and faultless legal system as being the 
innate requirement of a socialist system (Wen, 2010).  
 
Unlike Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping seems to reject Western beliefs and opposes 
“universal values”, personal freedom and civil society that are espoused by the United States 
and other nations (Kemp, 2015). Recently, one of the CCP’s state organs stated the 
importance of preventing party officials from becoming disoriented to Western ideals, and, 
furthermore, Xi Jinping shuns Western values in order to “avoid being lost in the clamor for 
Western democracy, ‘universal values’ and civil society” (in Sands, 2014). 
 
The “Asia-Pacific Dream” - A Threat to “Universal Values”? 
Before beginning my argumentation on whether or not the “Asia-Pacific Dream” poses a 
threat to “universal values”, I want to make clear that Xi Jinping in no words directly 
mentioned or attacked the concept of “universal values” in his speech at the 2014 APEC CEO 
Summit in Beijing. Therefore, my argumentation will be based on the interpretation of his 
speech, China’s foreign policy goals, and my own assumptions and hypotheses that I will 
back up with evidence found in other sources. The aim of this section is to bring new light 
into China’s diplomatic strategy and its conceivable influence on the discourse on “universal 
values”.  
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When closely examining Xi Jinping’s speech at the opening ceremony of the 2014 APEC 
CEO Summit in Beijing, it becomes conspicuous that his idea of an “Asia-Pacific Dream” 
resembles some principles of the “Beijing consensus” both in terms of the promotion of and 
focus on economic development and growth with the absence of political reforms and 
constraints.  
In his speech, he said that, “we need to jointly build an open economy in the Asia Pacific. 
Openness brings progress, while closed-up policy leads to backwardness” and that “we need 
to […] actively explore a new path and model that meets our own development needs and 
look for new growth points and impetus” (Xi, 2014). From this, we can see that Xi Jinping 
emphasizes the need for openness, innovation, reforms, and a new path and model for growth. 
He furthermore stresses new and open economic institutions and reforms without imposing 
other countries to adopt certain values, political systems or demand that they meet certain 
requirements. This proposed openness stands in stark contrast with the TPP that comes with 
tight political constraints from the U.S. and requirements to meet the “platinum standard” 
(Lim, Elms & Low, 2012: 203). The TPP’s “platinum standard” addresses stronger protection 
of labor and intellectual property rights, investment, e-commerce, environment, as well as 
regulations of state-owned enterprises, regional integration and development, thus making it 
difficult for developing and transitional economies to join the agreement, most noticeably 
China (Armstrong, 2011; Bush, 2014: 7). Also, the high TPP standards would require China 
to substantially change some policies, such as altering the structure and operation of state-
owned enterprises as well as information control and censorship policies (Yu, 2015). 
China’s push for new institutions and reforms becomes even more evident in Xi’s speech, 
in which he utters quite clearly that he wants to break with the status quo and prevailing 
institutions and models. It is therefore very much conceivable that he intends to promote a 
Chinese-led model of development, such as the “China Model”, and new ways for an open 
economic integration, as well as the establishment of new and open institutions. All of these 
stand in contrast to the U.S.-led development model, the “Washington consensus”, that 
includes political reforms, the promotion of democratic systems, practices and values, and 
other political reforms, of which some are also included in the U.S.-led trade agreement. Due 
to their connection to “universal values” (especially democratic values and human rights), it is 
in China’s strategic interest to promote certain new models and concepts, or at least gain 
legitimacy for them, that disregard such political reforms, constraints and “universal values”. 
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Interesting to mention here is the fact that Liu (2010, 11) describes the “China Model” as a 
system that does not acknowledge the existence of “universal values”. 
In Xi Jinping’s eyes, the “Asia-Pacific Dream” can be seen as an extension of the 
“Chinese Dream”; in order to become the Eastern dominant power and an important 
influencing and driving force of Asian-Pacific development, the “Chinese Dream”, “Asia-
Pacific Dream” and even “World Dream” must be closely connected to each other (Ni, 2014). 
By doing this, the governing principles of the Chinese Communist Party and economic 
development will contribute to the Asia-Pacific region and each country in the world, and will 
furthermore give new impetus for global and Asian-Pacific development through mutual trust, 
cooperation and a win-win approach (Ibid.). Ni’s (2014) article was published on the CCP’s 
online news website and reflects the government’s intention of not only promoting economic 
cooperation through the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, but also of spreading the idea of a Chinese 
development model with Chinese political values and governing principles, including strong 
power of the ruling political party with an absence of political liberalization.  
As the “China Model” has become more attractive in Southeast Asia, many countries, 
such as Thailand, have implemented strategies based on the Chinese development model over 
the past decade; examples of this include the recentralization of political decision-making, re-
establishment of the one-party rule, taking back state control of certain industries, internet 
monitoring and other tools of control (Kurlantzick, 2013). Zhou and Peng (2009: 132) argue 
that due to China’s rise and the “China Model”, China’s socialist system is also having 
increasing influence worldwide, which the United States and other Western countries regard 
as a threat to their ideology and system of values. Similarly, Wang (2013) argues that Western 
countries feel threatened by the “China Model” because its incorporated Chinese values may 
eventually replace dominant Western values. One of these political values that could pose a 
threat to Western values may include political meritocracy as an alternative to direct election 
of politicians. 
According to Ren (2015: 14), the United States have been using the “China threat theory” 
repeatedly as a political means and as an excuse to build and strengthen its allies and 
relationships with China’s neighboring countries, such as Japan, Vietnam and Myanmar. He 
furthermore points out that the struggle for and holding of a cultural and ideological position 
is among the core interests of countries in today’s world. In his eyes, the United States as a 
superpower is naturally attempting to firmly control ideological leadership authority (Ren, 
2015: 15). He argues that the United States have always had self-confidence in their 
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development model, but that China’s outstanding performance during the world financial and 
economic crisis in 2008 marked the success of the “China Model” and downfall of the 
American model which is one of the reasons why the United States feel threatened by China. 
The success of the “China Model” furthermore undermines the attractiveness and influencing 
power of the American model to developing countries, as well as the U.S. ability to control 
the world economy and international affairs. Because of this, Ren (2015: 15) concludes that 
the vilification of China’s image by means of the “China threat theory” is an inevitable 
strategy of the United States to impair China’s international influence. 
With regard to the U.S. “pivot to Asia” and the relationship-building between the U.S. and 
China as global powers, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry declared in a speech delivered at 
the Tokyo Institute of Technology in April 2013 that, “Our [American] Pacific Dream is to 
translate our strongest values into an unprecedented security, economic, and social co-
operation” (in Fu, 2013, emphasis added). Even though Kerry did not explicitly define what 
their strongest values are, it becomes evident that American values (that are likely related to 
“universal values”) constitute an important function in the U.S. pivot and relationship-
building in Asia. Kai (2015) furthermore states that,  
 
the West and especially the United States tend to use these concepts [i.e. 
democracy and other “universal values” such as freedom, equality, and justice] as 
‘weapons’ for intended regime or social changes in different regions. 
 
 
The U.S. intentions also become clear when listening to Obama’s speech at the 2014 APEC 
CEO Summit, where he said that,  
 
we [the United States] look forward to China to become an innovative economy 
that values the protection of intellectual property rights (…), and yes, to stand up 
for human rights and freedom of the press.  
 
In a later speech, Obama (2015) furthermore said that the TPP “reflects our values in ways 
that, frankly, some previous trade agreements did not”. 
From this, it becomes evident that “universal values” play a role in the promotion of the 
TPP and it is therefore very much conceivable that China’s current diplomatic strategy, 
including the promotion of the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, aims to undermine U.S. influence in the 
region and the spread of “universal values”. The Human Rights Watch (2015b) revealed that 
the CCP has issued directives to correct ideology among party members, lecturers, researchers 
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and journalists, warning them “against the perils of ‘universal values’ and human rights, and 
assert the importance of a pro-government and pro-CCP stance”. Also, in recent years, the 
CCP has been emphasizing Confucian values in its political narratives; these values include 
e.g. social stability, hierarchy, respect for authority and harmony, as they are deeply rooted in 
the Chinese culture and can be used by the CCP to legitimize its authority and one-party rule 
(Dotson, 2011:5). Chinese scholars, such as Yan Xuetong and Zhao Tingyang, believe that a 
political system based on Confucian ideas may be a better philosophy and system for world 
governance than the prevailing Western systems (in Ford, 2015: 1044). Hence, Ford (2015: 
1045) points out that international ambitiousness is an obvious element in some of the 
political Confucian ideas; therefore, he interprets pronouncements in the CCP’s political 
rhetoric talking about “breaking [the] hegemony of Western ‘universal values’” and “re-
globalization” as a Chinese attempt to replace “global development based upon Western 
values with a ‘real globalization’ in which ‘Chinese dreams’ enrich the world” (Ibid.). 
Regarding the CCP regime’s official discourse, Ford (2015: 1047) concludes that,  
 
the most interesting trend today may not be ‘de-ideologization’ but in fact the 
emergence and increasingly self-assertive promulgation of an ideological program 
of action self-consciously girding itself for battle against a Western democratic 
pluralism that it regards as its mortal enemy. 
 
Scenario Thinking 
Although U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the TPP in 2017, two scenarios will 
be presented below, i.e. either the TPP or the FTAAP will become effective, although they are 
not mutually exclusive. The probability of these policy outcomes and also the possibility that 
none of these trade agreements become effective will not be discussed. These scenarios only 
serve as examples to compare different policy outcomes in order to strengthen my 
argumentation and to indicate how regional economic integration, in this case FTA, may 
influence soft power and “universal values”. The actual probability of these outcomes is 
therefore irrelevant for this section. 
 
Scenario 1: Success of the U.S. TPP and “Pivot to Asia” 
If the United States succeed with rebalancing to Asia and making the TPP become effective, 
they will also secure their position as a balancing power and will be able to exert more 
influence in the region - economically, politically and socially - compared to if the FTA 
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would not become effective. Since the TPP is supposed to bring economic benefits to the 
region and lift the member countries’ standards to the so-called “platinum standard”, a 
successful and efficient cooperation will naturally lead to a positive association with 
American standards and values. This may provide a solid basis for further promoting 
American political culture and (Western) “universal values”. 
 
In this scenario, China of course would not lose its entire influence in the region, but the U.S. 
promoted values will pose a challenge to the Chinese ideology, and China will have to 
continue justifying itself and being criticized for violating human rights and not allowing its 
citizens democracy-related political rights. Furthermore, an effective TPP may have a 
negative impact on the image of China’s development model, because the explicit exclusion 
of China in the FTA is accounted for by China’s inability to reach the “platinum standard”. 
Thus, China’s economic development model - the “Beijing consensus” - and its appertaining 
ideological values may seem to be less appealing to other actors or regarded as being 
backward. 
 
Scenario 2: Realization of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and FTAAP 
It is quite obvious that there is little space for the United States in China’s “Asia-Pacific 
Dream” due to the emphasis on Asian unity and connectivity. Although Xi Jinping, on the one 
hand, states that “the door of the Asia Pacific will always be open to the entire world” (Xi, 
2014), this emphasis on Asian unity and connectivity, on the other hand, subtly excludes the 
United States from this dream. In his concept, Xi exactly addresses and promotes those issues 
that are necessary for consolidating China’s influence in the region, i.e. strengthening 
economic bonds, mutual trust and prosperity that derives from China’s economic 
development model (Xi invited the other Asian states to hop on China’s road of success and, 
therefore, indirectly to reach prosperity in the region in the Chinese way). If China 
successfully manages to promote and implement this idea, other actors may feel less strategic 
necessity to have the United States present in the region due to increased mutual trust and 
prosperity. Furthermore, a regional cooperation that is based on friendship and unity that 
everyone benefits from, as Xi promoted it, may result in Asian countries being less willing to 
express their distrust in China due to closer interdependencies. Altogether, this will gradually 
decrease America’s chance in terms of exerting influence in the region. Moreover, as China’s 
image and cooperation with other actors in the region improves and its development model 
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becomes more appealing to other states, certain Chinese values that are related to the “Beijing 
consensus”, as mentioned above, and simultaneously disregard Western values (including 
democratic and other “universal values”) may be spread throughout the region. According to 
the constructivist theory, this may happen due to the process of socialization that shapes other 
actors’ perceptions and may result in different countries identifying with each other’s values. 
Since China itself disregards Western democratic and other “universal values”, an assertive 
spread of Chinese values will undermine the foundation of “universal values”. This is due to 
the assumption that the more people and cultures that follow other values than the “universal” 
ones, the more questionable it will become whether these “universal values” are actually 
universal or just Western values in disguise. 
 
This scenario case envisions an Asian regional cooperation in which China plays a leading 
role and gives direction to regional development. It displays a future prospectus that would be 
ideal for China’s foreign strategy goals and it is conceivable that this is one of China’s 
intentions behind the “Asia-Pacific Dream”.  
 
Main Findings and Theoretical Contributions 
We need to look at international relations, China’s rise and promoted foreign policy concepts, 
such as the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, from a multidimensional perspective. The above analysis 
and discussion provide evidence that Xi Jinping’s promoted “Asia-Pacific Dream” can be 
considered as being part of China’s soft power strategy. Based on the extended soft power 
model introduced in this article, the soft power sources political values, foreign policies, 
economic development model, international image, culture and economic temptation, as well 
as the soft power mechanism norm diffusion are reflected in the “Asia-Pacific Dream”. Also, 
the three key elements of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” (i.e. development, economic connectivity 
and Asian unity with an emphasis on harmony, mutual benefits and prosperity for the whole 
region) are closely related to and resemble prevailing concepts of China’s soft power, 
including the “Beijing consensus”, China’s peaceful rise, “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence”, and “harmonious world”. This research indicates that the aim of Xi Jinping’s 
promotion of this dream is not only to strengthen economic bonds with its neighbors through 
FTA and to pose counter trade policies against the U.S. “pivot to Asia” and its entailed FTA 
initiative, the TPP; moreover, the “Asia-Pacific Dream” may become a powerful tool in 
consolidating China’s soft power and leadership position in the region.  
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While the research clearly shows that the “Asia-Pacific Dream” is deeply incorporated into 
China’s soft power strategy, it is more complex to elaborate on the link between the “Asia-
Pacific Dream” and “universal values”. Here, my argumentation is based on the concept’s 
connectedness to the “Beijing consensus” and the fact that it is directed against the U.S. 
“pivot to Asia”. A major objective of the TPP is to foster U.S. culture and values, including 
democracy, human rights and other values, rules and norms that the Americans perceive to be 
universal and progressive. Since the “Asia-Pacific Dream” is considered to be a counterpoint 
to the U.S. “pivot to Asia”, it is conceivable that one of the reasons for promoting this dream 
is not only to prevent the U.S. from exerting more influence in the region, but also to 
undermine “universal values”. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 2014 APEC CEO 
Summit, Xi Jinping also stated quite clearly that he wants to break with the status quo, 
prevailing institutions and development models, while continuously emphasizing innovation, 
reforms and new paths and models of development. One reason why he is not content with the 
status quo is most likely because China still has to pit itself against “universal values” and is 
often criticized for violating human rights and democracy-related values, including freedom 
of political speech and freedom of press. Since these pose a threat to the CCP’s political 
legitimacy and international image, China therefore has a strong interest in undermining 
“universal values”. Because of this, it is very much conceivable that Xi intends to use the 
“Asia-Pacific Dream” to promote a Chinese-led model of development, i.e. the “Beijing 
consensus”, along with new ways for an open economic integration, as well as the 
establishment of new and open institutions. This would challenge the prevailing U.S.-led 
development model, the “Washington consensus”, and some scholars believe that China 
intends to break the hegemony of (Western) “universal values” and strives for a new form of 
globalization in which Chinese values and dreams enrich the world. Hence, this article argues 
that the intrinsic motives behind the free trade initiatives, that are entailed to the U.S. “pivot to 
Asia” and China’s “Asia-Pacific Dream”, are not only of economic nature, but represent a 
competition for soft power and influence in the region. Moreover, they may play a significant 
role in ideological battles and the discourse on “universal values” as figure 2 illustrates. 
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Figure 2: The Link between Economic Integration, Soft Power and  
“Universal Values” 
 
Source: Illustration compiled by author. 
If China’s regional development model proves to be fruitful, it may pose a major challenge to 
some Western ideas and values such as the “Washington consensus” and associated 
“universal values”. This is due to the assumption that a successful regional cooperation in line 
with the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, the Chinese-style development model and associated 
ideologies and values would demonstrate a path of development for a major part of the 
world’s population that dispenses with Western democracy-related development concepts and 
values altogether. This process is theoretically realistic due to the soft power mechanism of 
norm diffusion, in which values or an economic development model may more likely be 
adopted by other actors if they are perceived to be successful or beneficial for them. Here, 
economic integration and FTA may serve as a door opener or accelerator for this process due 
to increased interaction between the actors, which may facilitate the spread or infiltration of 
values. Hence, it is conceivable that some (Western) “universal values” may lose their 
universality, which would in turn result in the United States forfeiting legitimacy to a certain 
degree in other foreign policies and affairs as well.  
While China’s rise and increasing efforts in consolidating its soft power in the region are 
posing major and diverse challenges to U.S. interests in the region, it remains uncertain how 
international relations and power constructs in the Asia-Pacific region will develop in the 
future. Currently, international relations in Asia are mainly based on economic ties and many 
countries are wary of China’s peacefulness due to several disputes, e.g. in the South China 
Sea and between Mainland China and Taiwan. It is therefore not surprising that other regional 
actors perceive the need of U.S. military presence in the region. If China manages to improve 
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policies and free trade 
agreements)
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its international image through the promotion of the discussed soft power concepts, 
international relations in the region may be strengthened in terms of mutual trust, co-
operation, establishment of networks and regional integration. However, although China is 
putting tremendous efforts in international propaganda and investing huge amounts of money 
into economic development projects in the region, the major future challenge will be to gain 
some credibility in its peaceful rise and intentions behind the “Asia-Pacific Dream” because 
China is still facing sharp criticism due to its contradictive behavior in regional territorial 
disputes and lack of certain political and “universal values”. Another concern that remains 
unanswered is the likelihood that the trade policies will come into effect and an exact 
prediction of the future of Asian international relations remains elusive at this point in time. 
By taking the example of the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, this article provides a new theoretical 
approach to elaborate the link between FTA (as a form of economic integration), soft power 
and “universal values”. It thus contributes to the theoretical discussion of China’s foreign 
policy strategy, its potential hidden intentions and the struggle for influence in Asia between 
China and the United States. My intention here is not to actually accuse Xi Jinping of using 
the “Asia-Pacific Dream” as a weapon to fight ideological battles. However, as the discussion 
above shows, there is at least reason enough to assume that shaping the discourse on 
“universal values” may be one of the intentions behind Xi Jinping’s “Asia-Pacific Dream”. 
Undoubtedly, further observation of China’s behavior and deeper academic discussion will be 
necessary to further prove my arguments. 
For future research, the questions remain whether my theoretical supposition also proves 
to be valid in real life. For this, future empirical research will be necessary in order to find out 
if China’s free trade policies and investments actually lead to e.g. the diffusion of certain non-
universal or Chinese values in the region, and how this may influence the discourse on 
“universal values”. Also, the research leaves us with the question of whether my theory can be 
generally applied to other forms of economic integration and FTA as well. As for now, this 
article brings new insights into the prevalent discussion and provides an impetus for further 
academic discussion on this subject matter. 
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